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ABSTRACT: An understanding of airblast uncertainty allows reliability-based load factors to be 
calculated. Reliability-based load factors are influenced by the variability of model error, explosive 
mass and range distance, and are estimated for reliability levels of 0.05 to 0.99 for military, civilian and 
terrorist munitions. Structural reliabilities are then calculated for reinforced concrete columns, and 
compared to target values. It was found that RC columns designed to existing standards have a 
significant margin of safety conditional on successful detonation of the explosive and assuming a 
relatively low variability of range or explosive mass. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A hazard of increasing interest is airblast loading 
from the accidental or malevolent detonation of 
explosives. For example, the manufacture, 
storage and handling of explosive ordnance (EO) 
poses risks to nearby infrastructure, and there is a 
need to ensure that damage and fatality risks are 
kept to acceptable levels. The variability of 
airblast pressure can be considerable (e.g., 
Netherton and Stewart 2010).  
The limit state requirement is: φRu ≥ ΣλiSi 
where φ is a capacity reduction factor, Ru is the 
design ultimate strength of the section, Si is the 
design load effect for load i, and λi is a load 
factor. UFC 3-340-02 (2008) recommends that 
φ=1.0 and λ=1.0 be used for structural design, 
and this appears to be the basis for the design of 
protective structures in many countries. 
However, as noted by Razaqpur et al. (2012), 
“the prevailing practice of using load factors 
equal to 1.0 in blast resistance design .. seems 
inconsistent with the design practice for other 
loads.” 
Current design practice as adopted by UFC 
3-340-02 (2008) recommends that the explosive 
mass be increased by a factor of 1.2 if accidental 
blast-loads are to be used for structural design 
(i.e., seems to apply to terrorism and EO 
situations). There seems to be little to no 
evidence to support the 20% “factor of safety”. 
The reliability-based load factor is 
represented herein as λ, which is consistent with 
terminology and nomenclature used in UFC 3-
340-01 (2002) where λ  is defined as a 
“reliability-based design load factor (RBDF)”. In 
accordance with UFC 3-340-02 (2008), 
reliability-based load factors are calculated 
herein where the nominal load (i.e. 20% mass 
increase ‘safety factor’ is not considered) is 
multiplied by the load factor (λ) to ensure that 
the actual load is equal to the reliability level.  
Stewart and Netherton (2015) and Stewart 
(2018a) used Monte-Carlo simulation to develop 
reliability-based design load factors where model 
error, range and explosive mass were random 
variables. The present paper extends this work by 
showing the effect that RBDFs have on structural 
reliability for RC columns designed for EO and 
terrorism blast scenarios. The blast scenarios 
cover a broad spectrum of explosive mass and 
range variabilities, thus showing how these 
variabilities effect RBDFs and structural 
reliabilities. This allows for reliability-based 
design to ensure that structures designed for 
explosive blast loading have an acceptable level 
of safety. 
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2. RELIABILITY OF RC COLUMNS 
The probability of failure conditional on a hazard 
H (e.g., explosive blast loading) is: 
Pr failure H( ) = Pr G(X) ≤ 0( )  (1) 
where G(X) is the limit state function, in the 
present case this is equal to resistance minus 
load, the n-dimensional vector X = {X1,....,Xn} 
are random variables representing a resistance or 
a loading random variable acting on the system. 
Failure occurs if G(X) ≤ 0. 
Shi et al. (2008) developed Pressure-Impulse 
(P-I) curves for three damage levels for RC 
columns subject to explosive blast loading, see 
Figure 1 for RC column details. The damage 






where N0 is the axial load carrying capacity 
of the undamaged column, and Nresidual is the 
axial load carrying capacity of the column due to 
blast damage. Numerical modelling considered 
shear and flexural damage in the estimation of 
N0. The damage levels considered were DI=0.2, 
0.5, and 0.8 representing low/medium, 
medium/high, and high/collapse degrees of 
damage. 
These P-I curves include the effect column 
width, column depth and column height, concrete 
compressive strength and reinforcing yield 
strength,  longitudinal reinforcement 
ratio,  and the transverse reinforcement ratio (Shi 
et al. 2008). Added to these are model errors 
MEPo and MEIo for peak reflected pressure and 
impulse, respectively. 
The limit state function for a RC column 
subject to explosive blast loading is described in 
full by Hao et al. (2016). 
The annual probability of failure (collapse) is  
pf = Pr H( )Pr failure H( )                               (3) 
where Pr(H) is the annual probability of the 
hazard. For this paper, this is the annual 
probability that explosive loading will occur - 
e.g., that a terrorist attack is successful, or 
explosives accidentally detonate. The term 




Figure 1: Details of RC column (Shi et al. 2008). 
 
The statistical parameters for a RC column 
are shown in Table 1. Note that the statistics for 
cross-sectional area of reinforcing steel include 
the important effect of discretisation of rebar 
sizes where the installed (constructed) steel 
reinforcement is likely to be higher than the 
nominal (design) values (Mirza and McGregor 
1979).  
The P-I curves are a best fit to numerical 
results (Shi et al. 2008). The fits are very good, 
however, it is reasonable to estimate that they are 
accurate to something like ±10%. In this case, if 
this uncertainty represents 95% of all values then 
the COV of model error for the P-I curves (MEPo, 
MEIo) is approximately 0.05. 
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Table 1: Statistical parameters for properties and 




Column width and 
breadth  1.005 0.04 Normal 
Column height 1.0 0.03 Normal 
Longitudinal 





1.03 0.06 Modified Logn. 
Concrete strength  1.06 0.15 Normal 
Yield Stress 1.15 0.05 Normal 
Model Errors 
(MEPo, MEIo) 
1.0 0.05 Normal 
 
3. AIRBLAST VARIABILITY 
The simplest case to analyse blast loads is that of 
a free-field detonation (i.e., in an open field). 
However, even in this “simple” case there are 
many sources of airblast variability and 
uncertainty, including: 
• mass of explosive 
• type of explosive  
• energetic properties of explosive 
• manufacture of explosives 
• detonator type  
• placement of detonator in explosive 
• detonation location (range) 
• temperature 
• atmospheric pressure 
• model errors 
• height of detonation 
• charge shape  
• charge orientation 
• casing effects  
• topography of ground surface 
In complex urban environments there are 
additional sources of airblast variability and 
uncertainty: 
• obstacles in path of airblast 
• building locations and geometries 
• building porosity 
• type of building facades 
• reflection of airblast from buildings, etc. 
• accuracy of CFD models 
Explosive mass is estimated as 
W=Wuser×WNEQ×Wmass where Wuser is the user factor, WNEQ is the NEQ (net equivalent quantity) 
factor, and Wmass is the desired mass treated as 
deterministic in this analysis. The user factor 
refers to the variability (due to weighing 
tolerances, human error) in the mass selected or 
used. The NEQ factor recognises that the NEQ of 
an explosive can vary due to variations in the 
explosive’s volume and/or density during 
manufacture, variations in mix proportions 
during manufacture, and other variables 
associated with storage and use of explosives. 
Variability of explosive mass may also arise from 
variability of charge shape, placement and type 
of detonators, height of blast, etc.  
The variability of range is highly dependent 
on the placement of the explosives, how it is 
placed there, and for weapons, the type of 
guidance system used. Range variability for 
explosive ordnance storage is close to a COV=0 
as the location of the explosives is known with 
considerable certainty. The location of a terrorist 
improvised explosive device (IED) or VBIED is 
less certain, but if the target is known, then 
minimum stand-off from a facility is obtained 
from knowledge of the site, access control and 
perimeter security.  
The magnitude of airblast is often 
normalised to be a function of scaled distance 
(Z=R/W1/3) where R is stand-off distance (m) and 
W is explosive mass (kg). For more details of the 
variability of explosive mass (W), range (R) and 
scaled distance (Z) see Stewart (2018a). 
The probabilistic blast load model developed 
by Netherton and Stewart (2010) uses Monte-
Carlo simulation to consider the variability of: 
(a) User factor for mass of explosive (Wuser), 
(b) NEQ of an explosive in terms of a mass 
of TNT (WNEQ), 
(c) The range (R) and Angle of Incidence,  
(d) Air temperature and pressure, and 
(e) Model error (including Inherent 
variability) of predictive load models. 
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 Probabilistic models for model error and 
inherent variability were obtained from field data 
of repeatable tests for reflected pressures and 
impulses (for more details see Stewart and 
Netherton 2015). The Kingery-Bulmash model 
has been incorporated into widely used and well 
respected blast load design models, such as 
ConWep, UFC 3-340-02 (2008) and LS-DYNA, 
and is used herein as the predictive model 
airblast. Note that once instrument error is 
removed from the analysis, inherent variability is 
less than 0.01. Hence, this source of variability is 
included in model error statistics. Model error 
statistics for airblast are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Statistical parameters (Lognormal) for 
model error if Z<4.7 m/kg1/3. 
 Mean COV 
Pressure: MEP 1.03 0.087 
Impulse: MEI 0.905+0.0203Z 0.198-0.024Z 
 
The results to follow assume that the 
explosive detonates on or very near to the 
ground. It is thus considered a hemispherical 
charge detonating against a reflecting surface. 
The blast load is from a single uninterrupted 
emanation of the shock-wave, and that reflections 
from other structures or surfaces are not 
considered. All detonations are assumed to occur 
within air that is at 15o C and 1013.25 hPa. These 
assumptions provides the basis for the design of 
many protective structures. 
The utility of the probabilistic approach is 
shown by a weaponeering scenario. The air force 
may be concerned about collateral damage to a 
civilian building 50 m from the military target. If 
the desired point of impact is the military target, 
Figure 2 shows the peak reflected pressure on the 
civilian building if a 500 lb Mark-82 GPS guided 
bomb is used (Netherton and Stewart 2010). 
Figure 2 shows that there is 43% chance that the 
design (anticipated) load will be exceeded. Thus, 
there is increased likelihood of damage and 
casualties to civilians. Whereas a fully 
deterministic analysis would say that as long as 
the civilian building can withstand a pressure of 
24.5 kPa then no damage or casualties would 
occur. This ignores the high chance that in reality 
such loads can be exceeded. 
 
 
Figure 2: Blast Loads from a Collateral 
Damage Scenario. 
 
4. CASE STUDIES 
The US Department of Defense Structures to 
Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions (UFC 
3-340-02 2008) is typically used for the design of 
RC columns subject to explosive blast loading. 
The RC column is not permitted to attain large 
plastic deformation, hence, design is based on 
elastic or slightly plastic action. This leads to a 
design damage index of DI=0.2 (Stewart 2018b). 
In the following examples it is assumed that RC 
columns will be designed using the Shi et al. 
(2008) P-I curves for a damage index of 0.2. 
Two blast scenarios are considered: 
1. EO scenario - This hypothetical explosive 
case study assumes that Wmass=20,000 kg 
of bare exposed TNT explosive is stored 
outside, above ground and without bunker 
protection. The distance from this potential 
explosive site to the building of interest is 
R=80 m and the building is not protected 
by any barricade. The COV of charge mass 
is VW=0.025 (Stewart 2018a). Because the 
location of the stored explosives is known 
with certainty, range is deterministic 
(VR=0). Mean scaled distance is 
Z=2.95 m/kg1/3 and COV is VZ≈0.01.   
2. Terrorist scenario – This may involve a 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 
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(VBIED) containing Wmass=2,000 kg of 
home-made ANFO (ammonium nitrate fuel 
oil). The WNEQ for ANFO is 0.82. The 
variability of home-made ANFO may be 
considerable with VW=0.25, if the VBIED 
is located within a ±2 m tolerances then 
COV of R is VR=0.05 for a range of 
R=25 m (e.g., Stewart 2018a). Mean 
Z=2.12 m/kg1/3 and COV is VZ=0.10. 
For more scenarios see Stewart (2018b). 
It is assumed that R, W and Z are 
lognormally distributed. Note that blast load 
variability (and hence, load factors) is expected to 
increase if a more realistic assessment of charge 
shape and orientation, impact orientation of 
bombs (e.g. half buried), casing effects, etc. are 
considered. 
The RC columns are assumed to be exterior 
columns – i.e., those closest to the external blast 
loading (see Figure 3). The RC columns are 
designed assuming: 
a) No load or safety factors, 
b) Mass increase factor (MIF) of 20% is 
applied to charge mass in accordance 
with UFC 3-340-02 (2008), or 
c) Reliability based load factors (RBDF) for 
0.95 and 0.99 reliability estimated form 




Figure 3: Schematic Position of Column (Shi et 
al. 2008). 
 
Figure 4 shows a schematic of RBDFs. 
Blast loads are dependent on the mass of 
explosive, range, type of explosive, angle of 
incidence, and air temperature and pressure. 
However, the reliability-based load factor 
(RBDF or λ) is invariant to the design values of 
these parameters, as these affect the nominal load 
and probabilistic load equally. The effects of 
these design parameters hence cancel out in the 
calculation of λ, and so λ is only a function of 
scaled distance and the variability of these 
parameters. Note, that this finding holds if the 
deterministic (nominal) values used for 
predicting nominal loads are equal to the mean 
values as used in the probabilistic model of 
airblast variability. Note also that RBDFs are 
insensitive to the mean and COV of air 
temperature and pressure (Stewart 2018a). 
Hence, the RBDF (λ) is dependent only on: 
• nominal scaled distance Z=R/W1/3, 
• COV of scaled distance (VZ) for pressure,  
• VW and VZ for impulse, and 
• statistics of blast loading model error for 
pressure (MEP) and impulse (MEI). 
 
Figure 4: Schematic of Reliability-Based Load 
Factor for a Reliability Level of 0.95. 
 
Note that RBDFs will increase as the 
variability of mass and range increase. Table 3 
shows the RBDFs for the terrorism scenario as a 
function of scaled distance. It is observed that, as 
expected, the RBDF is approximately unity for a 
50% reliability level. As the reliability level 
increases the RBDFs increase, sometimes 
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Table 3: RBDFs for peak reflected pressure, for 













0.05 0.66 0.63 0.73 0.79 0.81 
0.10 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.85 
0.50 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 
0.90 1.46 1.54 1.37 1.28 1.25 
0.95 1.61 1.72 1.48 1.36 1.32 
0.99 1.93 2.11 1.71 1.52 1.47 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 EO Scenario 
Table 4 shows the RBDFs and design loads, for 
the RC column designed for Scenario 1. As 
expected, the MIF has higher design loads and so 
requires a stronger column, and the size increases 
again as RBDFs are applied. 
 
Table 4: RBDFs and design loads. 









RBDF (λ) - Pressure 1.0 - 1.2 1.25 
RBDF (λ) - Impulse 1.0 - 1.2 1.3 
Design Press. (kPa) 350 410 410 440 
Design Imp. (kPa.sec) 6.21 7.06 7.45 8.01 
 
The probability of failure conditional on the 
hazard is calculated using Monte-Carlo 
simulation, see Table 5. For extreme events 
loading some damage to structures is expected 
for the design event. However, there is expected 
to be considerable reserve capacity defined as the 
capacity above that predicted from design codes. 
Hence, as discussed in Section 4, UFC 3-340-02 
(2008) design provisions are conservative and 
provide a reasonable margin of safety against 
collapse. Hence, the probability of collapse given 
a blast load Pr(failure|H) is expected to be a 
relatively low number, and Table 5 shows that 
Pr(failure|H) is about 1×10-3 if no safety factors 
are applied. This collapse probability reduces by 
about 25-fold if the 20% MIF is applied to 
charge mass W. These probabilities reduce four-
fold again when the RC column is designed for a 
RBDF with a 0.99 level of reliability (i.e. 1% 
chance of load exceedance). 
 
Table 5: Reliabilities for RC columns. 
 EO Scenario 








Pr(failure|H) 1.2×10-3 4.9×10-5 3.9×10-5 1.4×10-5 
Pr(H) 8.1×10-3 8.1×10-3 8.1×10-3 8.1×10-3 
Annual pf 9.7×10-6 4.0×10-7 3.2×10-7 1.1×10-7 
 
The annual probability of the hazard (i.e., 
explosive event) for the EO scenario is based on 
guidance from the U.S. Department of Defense 
and the Department of Defense Explosives Safety 
Board (DDESB). In this case, if the explosives 
(Compatibility Group D) are for disposal for 
“Operations involving dangerously unserviceable 
items awaiting destruction” then Pr(H)= 8.1×10-3 
per year (DDESB 2009). The annual probabilities 
of failure pf given by Eqn. (3) are also shown in 
Table 5. Note that ISO 2394 (2015) recommends 
βT =4.7 for ultimate strength limit states design 
where consequences of failure are high (Class 4) 
and cost of safety measures are small. This is 
equivalent to an annual probability of failure of 
pf=1.3×10-6. Hence, designing a RC column with 
no safety or load factors fails to satisfy the target 
reliability for this scenario, and such a design 
would not comply to ISO 2394 (2015). However, 
all other RC designs satisfy the target reliability 
for the EO scenario. 
 Figures 5 and 6 show the conditional 
probability of failure Pr(failure|H) for this EO 
scenario when the RC column is not designed for 
any safety or load factors, as a function of range 
and explosive mass. The size of the RC column is 
based on the design pressure and impulse given 
in Table 4, hence, these figures show the effect of 
actual range or mass being higher or lower than 
the design values. Clearly, failure probabilities 
are sensitive to small changes in range, and less 
so for explosive mass. For example, if the range 
to the EO reduces from 80 m to 60 m, the failure 
probability is close to 100% if the RC column is 
only designed for an 80 m standoff (see Figure 
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5). On the other hand, explosive mass needs to 
increase by 150% for the failure probability to 
reach 100%, see Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Range on the Conditional Failure 
Probability for a RC Column Designed for the EO 
Scenario with No Load or Safety Factors. 
 
 
Figure 6: Effect of Explosive Mass on the 
Conditional Failure Probability for a RC Column 
Designed for the EO Scenario with No Load or Safety 
Factors. 
5.2 Terrorism Scenario 
Airblast variability is higher for the terrorist 
VBIED scenario when compared to the EO 
scenario because variability of range and mass 
are both higher. Hence, Table 6 shows that the 
RBDFs for the terrorist VBIED scenario are 
higher. As expected, the probability of failure 
conditional on the successful detonation of the 
VBIED Pr(failure|H) increase when the VBIED 
contains the more variable home-made ANFO 
(see Table 7). 
 
Table 6: RBDFs and design loads. 









RBDF (λ) - Pressure 1.0 - 1.64 1.98 
RBDF (λ) - Impulse 1.0 - 1.39 1.63 
Design Press. (kPa) 340 780 1,110 1,360 
Design Imp. (kPa.sec) 1.90 3.62 4.45 5.24 
 
Table 7: Reliabilities for RC columns. 
 Terrorism Scenario 








Pr(failure|H) 1.2×10-3 4.9×10-5 1.5×10-12 2.7×10-19 
Pr(H) 1×10-6 1×10-6 1×10-6 1×10-6 
Annual pf 1.2×10-9 4.9×10-11 1.5×10-18 2.7×10-25 
 
The annual probability of a terrorist attack 
involving a VBIED will be low, and the odds are 
even lower that the attack is successful in 
detonating a large amount of home-made 
explosives such as ANFO. Stewart (2017) 
estimates that a VBIED threat probability is 
approximately 8×10-6 per building per year for 
attacks on large government and defence 
buildings in the United States. A statistical 
analysis of the Global Terrorism Database for 
IED attacks in the United States reveals that the 
probability that an IED will successfully detonate 
is around 15% (Grant and Stewart 2015, 2017). 
The likelihood that a large VBIED would 
successfully detonate, and reach maximum 
energetic output will be lower than 15%, 
particularly taking into account the difficulty of 
obtaining explosives and preparing them for 
maximum energetic output. Hence, the hazard 
likelihood Pr(H) is 8×10-6 × 15% = 1×10-6 per 
building per year.  
The annual probabilities of failure then all 
fall below the target values recommended by 
ISO 2394 (2015). Moreover, the annual 
probabilities of failure are less than 10-18 for 
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RBDFs for this scenario. Ellingwood (2006) 
suggested that the threat probability be taken as 
1×10-4 per building per year for key 
governmental and international institutions, 
monumental or iconic buildings or other critical 
facilities with a specific threat. Even with this 
higher threat likelihood the annual probabilities 
of failure still all fall below the target value. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Reliability-based load factors were 
calculated that considered the variability of 
model error, explosive mass and range. 
Reliability-based load factors were estimated for 
a reinforced concrete column, for explosive 
ordnance and terrorism blast scenarios. Structural 
reliabilities were then calculated, and compared 
to target values. It was found that RC columns 
designed to existing standards have a significant 
margin of safety conditional on successful 
detonation of the explosive and assuming a 
relatively low variability of scaled distance. 
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